On 23 February 2026, the Board of Directors of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) approved a new wave of strategic investments in Africa, officially aimed at strengthening U.S. supply chains for critical minerals and consolidating the country’s energy security.
While the transactions remain confidential at this stage, their potential implications for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are considerable. As the world’s leading producer of cobalt, holding more than 70% of proven global reserves, the DRC has emerged as a pivotal player in the global energy transition. According to official data from its Ministry of Mines, more than 90% of the country’s mining potential remains untapped, with an estimated value exceeding USD 25 billion.
The DFC announcement comes amid an unprecedented institutional shift. The Congress of the United States has recently and significantly expanded the agency’s mandate: the investment cap has been raised to USD 205 billion, its equity participation powers strengthened, and a revolving investment fund created. In practical terms, the DFC is no longer limited to loans or guarantees—it can now take direct equity stakes in projects deemed strategic.
In the Congolese context, this evolution opens the door to direct involvement in projects linked to cobalt, lithium, or copper—minerals essential for batteries, electric vehicles, and energy infrastructure, now at the heart of global industrial rivalries.
From Washington to Kinshasa: an explicit U.S. strategy
This momentum is part of a broader U.S. strategy, formalized in early February 2026 at the Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, which brought together delegations from more than 50 countries, including seven African nations. On that occasion, the United States signed new memoranda of understanding with Guinea and Morocco, following agreements concluded in December 2025 with the DRC and Rwanda.
The objective is explicit: to reduce U.S. dependence on China, which currently dominates the refining industry. According to the International Energy Agency, the majority of the world’s copper, lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths were processed by China in 2024.
Without naming it directly, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged on 4 February that global supplies of critical minerals are “highly concentrated in the hands of one country” and could become a geopolitical lever. Earlier, President Donald Trump had launched Project Vault, aimed at creating a U.S. strategic reserve of critical minerals, backed by an initial USD 10 billion financing via the Export-Import Bank of the United States.
Within this framework, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi traveled to Washington, where he met U.S. senators and the president of the EXIM Bank. Discussions focused on the commercialization of Congolese critical minerals, local processing, and projects linked to the Lobito Corridor—a rail and infrastructure axis connecting Angola’s port of Lobito to the Congolese Katanga region and Zambia.
Regional corridor: integration or redirection of value?
The DFC statement refers to a cross-border pilot project involving the DRC, possibly within a regional framework with Rwanda. This reference revives major questions. For several years, the structuring of export and processing corridors for Congolese minerals has fueled regional tensions. A corridor can be a logistical lever—but it also raises fundamental issues:
- Where will processing take place?
- Where will value added be captured?
- Under which jurisdiction will final exports be registered?
These questions are all the more sensitive given that the strategic agreement signed between Washington and Kinshasa in December 2025 was negotiated alongside a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, under U.S. mediation. Yet despite this agreement, hostilities persist in eastern DRC, particularly in North Kivu, where the M23, backed by Rwanda according to the United Nations, continues to exert sustained military pressure.
This interplay between trade agreements, security, and peace has sparked serious concern within Congolese civil society. In January 2026, a collective of lawyers and human rights defenders filed a petition with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the critical minerals agreement should have been submitted to Parliament for approval or put to a referendum, given its implications for national laws.
For Le Congo n’est pas à vendre, existing safeguards remain insufficient. Its spokesperson, Jean-Claude Mputu, denounces an agreement that “prioritizes geopolitics at the expense of human rights, justice, and environmental protection,” leaving these issues in blind spots.
To be sure, the DFC claims to apply environmental and social standards aligned with international norms. In theory, this could improve the management of mining waste, site rehabilitation, consultation with local communities, and environmental transparency. In practice, however, everything will depend on the precise contractual clauses, monitoring mechanisms, and public access to information—both in Washington and in Kinshasa.
Beyond announcements, the strategic challenge for the DRC is clear. The DFC’s growing financial and political clout could represent a historic window of opportunity—provided that Kinshasa imposes:
- local processing requirements,
- technology transfers,
- training mechanisms,
- strengthened contractual transparency.
Without these safeguards, the country risks remaining at the center of global critical mineral production without controlling its industrial destiny or sustainably capturing the value created.
The projects approved by the DFC have not yet been publicly identified. Negotiations are ongoing, and final commitments will depend on further steps, including notifications to the U.S. Congress. One certainty already stands out: the DRC has become a strategic pivot in the global reconfiguration of critical mineral supply chains. In this new phase of geo-economic competition, mining sovereignty is not proclaimed—it is negotiated, contracts in hand, standards enforced, and value added secured on Congolese soil.
By Kilalopress